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COMMENTS 
A Divided Country in Foreign Courts-Recent Litigation 
Involving Germany's Legal Status and the 
Zeiss Stiftung 
The partition of countries in the wake of the second World War 
accounts for two Asian battlefields: Korea and Viet Nam. In Europe, 
where a dividing line was drawn through Germany, military hos-
tilities have been avoided thus far. Instead, the controversies origi-
nating from that line are fought out at the conference table, through 
public and private media ·of communication, and in the court-
houses. 
I. CARL ZEISS STIFTUNG 
Many of the fighting issues are reflected and squarely presented 
in the countless cases relating to a single enterprise: the Zeiss 
Stiftung.1 Although the issues in each of these cases are necessarily 
varied, the gist of all of them is identical and can be easily stated 
in a few words: who is entitled to use the name "Zeiss" or "Carl 
Zeiss" as a business name or trade-mark? Two groups of persons, one 
East German, the other West German, are in violent conflict over 
this right, each claiming to represent the Carl Zeiss Stiftung. Origi-
nally, that organization had its legal domicile in Jena where it was 
established in 1889, with its charter being ratified in 1896. At the 
end of World War II, Thuringia, the province in which Jena is 
situated, was occup'ied by American forces. However, shortly there-
after, pursuant to agreements with the Soviet Union, the Americans 
withdrew and Jena became part of East Germany.2 The leading 
officers of the Zeiss Stiftung as well as several of its employees went 
to West Germany when the Americans left, taking with them im-
1. Under German law, a Stiftung (foundation) is a legal entity administering a 
conglomeration of assets. After establishment, it is treated as a legal person owning 
the property under its administration; but unlike a corporation it has no shareholders 
or any kind of members. See 1 MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 38 (Foreign Office ed. 1950). 
The Zeiss Stiftung is unusual in that it owns sizeable economic enterprises, whereas 
ordinarily a Stiftung is either used for purposes of family settlement or for charitable 
or scientific purposes. On the history, the legal nature of the Zeiss Stiftung, and the 
philosophy on which it rests, see DAVID, DIE CARL-ZEISS-SllFTIJNG, IHRE VERGANCENHEIT 
UND IHRE GEGENWAERTIGE RECHTUCHE LAGE (1954); Mayer, The Zeiss Foundation, 10 
J. PUB. L. 384 (1961 ). 
2. This action conformed to the Protocol on Zones of Occupation and Adminis-
tration of the "Greater :Berlin" Area, Sept. 12, 1944, adopted by the European Advisory 
Commission. See DocuMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, at 1 (United States Senate, Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations ed. 1961). See also excerpts from the correspondence 
between President Truman and Marshal Stalin on the withdrawal of western troops 
and their movement into :Berlin in DOCUMENTS ON :BERLIN 1943-1963, at 23-24 (Heidel-
meyer & Hindrichs eds. 1963). 
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portant documents, such as patents, drawings, and files.3 With the 
aid of those documents, and by making use of the Stiftung's interests 
in West German enterprises, these persons began to conduct a busi-
ness in West Germany and, after a short period, they began to use the 
name "Zeiss" for their products and their enterprise. They pur-
ported to modify the basic instrument governing the Stiftung, the 
so-called Stiftungsstatut (Charter), so as to make the West German 
city of Heidenheim the domicile of the Stiftung.4 
Meanwhile, the authorities exercising power in East Germany 
appointed new officers for the Stiftung. In 1948, two enterprises 
situated in Jena and owned by the Stiftung were confiscated and 
became so-called "People's Owned Enterprises." The Stiftung, how-
ever, was not dissolved or nationalized. On the contrary, the East 
German authorities purported to keep it alive and issued a statement 
to the effect that the nationalized enterprises would have certain 
rights and obligations vis-a-vis the Stiftung which would be deter-
mined by a revised Stiftungsstatut.5 
II. LITIGATION OVER THE USE OF THE NAME "ZEISS" 
The stage was thus set for the world-wide controversy between 
two rival organizations over the legitimate use of the five letters 
forming the profit-boosting name "Zeiss." In this country, an action 
involving the Stiftung has been pending for many years, but it 
appears to be still in the pre-trial stage.6 In Great Britain, a case was 
brought more than 10 years ago, yet it was not until May of 1966 
that the House of Lords decided the preliminary issue of whether 
the East German plaintiff could authorize an action in a British 
court despite the British government's non-recognition of the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (the East German state).7 In Switzerland, 
a suit was started in 1962 and decided by the Bundesgericht, the 
highest court of that country, in 1965.8 Germany itself is, of course, 
the country with the greatest incidence of "Zeiss" litigation. The 
3. For details, see Mayer, supra note 1, at 400. 
4. Actually this flies in the face of the charter which provides in article 3 that 
Jena shall be the Stiftung's domicile and in article 121 that this rule (and others) 
may not, under any circumstances, be changed. For arguments in support of the 
change of domicile despite the language of those provisions, see Nipperdey, Die 
Rechtslage der Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung und der Firma Carl Zeiss seit 1945, in FESTSCHRIFT 
WALn:R. SCHMIDT-RIMPLER. 41, 53-61 (1957). 
5. For more detailed statements of facts, see cases cited notes 7-10 infra. 
6. Letter From Isaac Shapiro of Milbank, Tweed, Hadly 8: McCloy, New York, to 
the author, Sept. 28, 1966. The action was commenced in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York in February 1962, and discovery has 
been in progress ever since. 
7. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner 8: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125 
(H.L.) [hereinafter referred to as the Zeiss case or the English Zeiss case]. 
8. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena v. Firma Carl Zeiss Heidenheim, Bundesgericht, March 30, 
1965, 91 II Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes 117 (Switz.). 
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decisions rendered by West German courts are innumerable;9 for 
East Germany, the matter was settled by a decision of its highest 
court in 1961.10 Several other countries have had their share of 
"Zeiss" litigation. 
A. The English Court of Appeal and the Doctrine 
of Recognition 
As the brief narrative above indicates, these controversies in-
evitably present courts with one or more of the intricate questions 
relating to Germany's post-war status as a defeated and occupied 
country which, after 20 years of gradual transformation, is still only 
semi-independent and divided.11 The most extensive, and in some 
respects the most startling, discussion of these questions is to be 
found in the opinions rendered in the English Zeiss case.12 That 
case was brought by persons in East Germany purporting to act for 
the Stiftung itself, not for the nationalized enterprises which for-
merly belonged to the Stiftung. The plaintiff prayed for an injunc-
tion against the use of the name "Zeiss" by the West German group 
and its two English retailers. The defendants raised an objection on 
the ground that the action was begun and maintained without the 
authority of the Stiftung. While the trial judge overruled this objec-
tion, the Court of Appeal accepted it after receiving a certificate from 
the Foreign Secretary to the effect that "Her Majesty's Government 
have not granted any recognition de jure or de facto to (a) the 
'German Democratic Republic' or (b) its Government.''13 In view 
9. The most important cases are: Judgment of July 24, 1957, Bundesgerichtshof, 
1954-57 Sammlung der deutschen Entscheidungen zum interzonalen Privatrecht 
[hereinafter cited as IzRsPR.] No. 222 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); Judgment of Jan. 28, 1958, 
Bundesgerichtshof, 1958-59 IzRsPR. No. 60 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); Judgment of Nov. 15, 1960, 
Bundesgerichtshof, 1960-61 IzRsPR. No. 52 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); Judgment of June 30, 
1961, Bundesgerichtshof, 1960-61 IzRsPR. No. 136 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
IO. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Firma Carl Zeiss in Oberkochen/Wuerttemberg, Oberstes 
Gericht der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, March 23, 1961, 8 Entscheidungen 
des Obersten Gerichts der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in Zivilsachen 208 
(Ger. Dem. Rep.). 
11. The United States, Britain, and France recognized West Germany as having 
"the fnll authority of a sovereign State." See Convention on Relations between the 
Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, art. 1(2), 6 
U.S.T. &: O.I.A. 4251, T.I.A.S. No. 3425, as amended by the Protocol on the Termina-
tion of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 
6 U.S.T. &: O.I.A. 4121, T.I.A.S. No. 3425. However, under article 2 of the Convention, 
as amended, the three former occupation powers "retain the rights and the responsi-
bilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as 
a whole." For an analysis, see BLUMENWITZ, DIE GRUNDLAGEN EINES FRIEDENSVERTRAGES 
MIT DEUTSCHLAND 108-12 (1966); Bishop, The "Contractual Agreements" with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 125 (1955). With respect to East 
Germany, similarly contradictory declarations have been made by the Soviet Union. 
See BLUMENWITZ, op. cit. supra at 112-15. 
12. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125 
(H.L.). 
13. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), {1965] I Ch. 596, 637 (C.A. 
1964). 
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of this certificate, the appellate court held that it could not give effect 
to the acts which authorized plaintiff's solicitors to bring the action.14 
Why was the recognition point relevant to a disposition of the 
case? Supposedly, since the City of Berne v. Bank of England,15 the 
English courts have adhered to the doctrine that they cannot take 
notice of a state or a government which is not recognized by their 
own government and that they must ignore all acts of whatever 
nature emanating from such state or government. Yet in this case 
the action was brought neither by an unrecognized government nor 
by a legal entity created under the laws of such a government. 
Rather, the plaintiff Stiftung had been incorporated long before 
Germany was divided into two states.16 Consequently, the theory 
espoused by the defendants and accepted by the Court of Appeal is 
not that the existence of the Stiftung must be disregarded altogether. 
Rather, it rests on two provisions of the Stiftungsstatut which link in 
a peculiar way the management of the Stiftung to the political 
authorities governing Thuringia. These provisions are to a large 
extent the nub of the case and account for the fact that it presents so 
many of Germany's politico-legal problems in a nutshell. In order to 
fully understand these crucial provisions, it must be kept in mind 
that at the time they were drafted, Jena belonged to the Grand 
Duchy of Saxe-Weimar which became a part of the "Land" of 
Thuringia when that body was created in 1918. In article 5 of the 
Zeiss Stiftungsstatut, it is provided that that department of the Grand 
Duchy which supervises the University of Jena should function, 
under the name of "Stiftungsverwaltung," as the governing board of 
the Stiftung.17 In addition, article 5 authorizes the Stiftungsverwal-
tung to appoint a person to act as its permanent agent (the "Stif-
tungskommissar") who must be chosen from among the high state 
officials of the Grand Duchy. Due to some remarkable foresight, 
article 113 of the Stiftungsstatut provided for the contingency that 
political changes rendering article 5 unworkable might occur. It 
states that, if there is a department in Thuringia controlling the 
University of Jena, it will act as Stiftungsvenvaltung; othenvise this 
function will be exercised by "the highest administrative authority 
in Thuringia."18 Quite obviously, the plaintiff had to invoke article 
113 in order to establish valid authorization of its solicitors since the 
Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar is a matter of fairy-tale past. Plaintiff's 
14. Id. at 651, 662. 
15. 9 Ves. 347, 32 Eng. Rep. 636 (Ch. 1804). 
16. See p. 924 supra. 
17. For a translation of article 5 of the Stiftungsstatut, see Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. 
Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1965) I Ch. 596, 601 (C.A. 1964). Since the Court of 
Appeal felt that the translation is rather inadequate, id. at 639, the reader may want 
to check the German original which is reproduced in Nipperdey, supra note 4, at 42. 
18. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1965] I Ch. 596, 602 
(C.A. 1964), for a translation of article 113 of the Stiftungsstatut, the German text of 
which is reproduced in Nipperdey, supra note 4, at 42. 
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position would have been much easier, if, at least, the Land Thur-
ingia were still in existence, but in 1952 the government of the 
German Democratic Republic abolished the Land and replaced it 
by three smaller units (Bezirke) each headed by a council (Rat).19 
Thus, there is no "highest administrative authority" having power 
over all of Thuringia. The only body to which plaintiff could point 
as Stiftungsverwaltung, and which in fact exercises that function, is 
the Council of Gera.20 The Council governs that part of Thuringia 
in which Jena lies and may therefore be said to meet the description 
in article 113, although it is a creature of the German Democratic 
Republic-a state which is not recognized by the British govern-
ment. This last consideration prompted the Court of Appeal to 
refuse to take cognizance of the Council's existence and of the act by 
which it had authorized the bringing of an action in England. Hence 
the importance of the recognition issue. 
B. The House of Lords and East Germany as an 
Agent of the Soviet Union 
Whether the Court of Appeal's approach to the issue is sound 
seems questionable. As one commentator said, the decision is sin-
gularly devoid of policy arguments. 21 But it has, at least, the merit of 
being straight-forward in its adherence to a supposedly settled, albeit 
doubtful, doctrine.22 The House of Lords, on the other hand, while 
paying lip-service to the doctrine, tried to avoid its consequences in 
a rather circuitous and hardly convincing fashion. The hard core of 
the holding by the House of Lords is that the existence of the 
Council of Gera and its functioning as Stiftungsverwaltung can and 
19. This reorganization took place on the basis of a "Law Relating to the Further 
Democratization of the Organization and the Working Method of Public Authorities 
in the Laender of the German Democratic Republic," passed on July 23, 1952 (1952 
GESETZBLATI' DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBUK 613). 
20. Pursuant to § 4(a) of the statute refened to in the preceding note, the functions 
previously exercised by the Laender were transfened to the authorities of the Bezirke. 
21. Note, The Laws of Unrecognized Governments in the English Courts: The 
Carl Zeiss Stiftung Case, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 311, 319 (1966). 
22. Counsel for plaintiff in the English Zeiss case argued, inter alia, that American 
courts have not applied the doctrine as rigidly as the English courts purport to do. 
See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125, 138 
(H.L.). The most recent comprehensive discussion of the American attitude will be 
found in Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts: Upright v. 
Mercury Business Machines, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 275 (1962). In England, a more flexible 
approach, along the lines taken by American courts, has been advocated by Greig, The 
Carl-Zeiss Case and the Position of an Unrecognized Government in English Law, 83 
L.Q. REv. 96, 128-38 (1967); and Lipstein, Recognition of Governments and the Applica-
tion of Foreign Laws, 35 THE GROTIUS SOCIETY: TRANSACTIONS FOR nm YEAR 1949, 157, 
183-87 (1950). The Greig article questions rather persuasively whether the authorities 
prior to Luther v. Sagar, [1921] I K.B. 456, really stand for the proposition that English 
courts will not give any effect to the acts of an unrecognized government. See id. at 
105-11. 
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must be given effect in an English forum. This holding, however, is 
not based on the theory that a legally significant situation in a 
foreign country must sometimes be taken into account, even though 
it was created by a non-recognized regime. Rather, it rests on the 
assumption that the acts of the German Democratic Republic are 
acts by an agent of the Soviet Union-a recognized state. To be sure, 
at one point in his opinion, Lord Reid endeavors to express frankly 
his dissatisfaction with the implication of the approach taken by the 
Court of Appeal.23 But suddenly, he seems to become horrified by 
the prospect of being compelled to re-examine the venerable doc-
trine and takes refuge by adopting a theory which supposedly saves 
the court from this task. In his view, the judges of the lower court 
misunderstood the true import of the information they received from 
the Foreign Secretary.24 In a second certificate, the Secretary had 
stated that the British government has recognized, from the end of 
the war to the date of the certificate (November 6, 1964), the state 
and government of the Soviet Union as de jure entitled to exercise 
governing authority with respect to the zone allocated to it by agree-
ments with the Western allies. After emphasizing the joint authority 
of the four powers in matters affecting Germany as a whole, which 
authority was exercised for a period of time by the Control Council 
for Germany, the certificate asserted: "Her Majesty's Government 
have not recognized either de jure or de facto any other authority 
purporting to exercise governing authority in or in respect of the 
zone. "25 The Court of Appeal, far from disregarding this part of the 
information, had discussed it at great length. It had found that 
the certificate did not prevent it from taking notice of the fact that 
the Soviet Union, which was entitled to exercise governing authority 
in its zone, had in effect ceased to do so by setting up the German 
Democratic Republic and eventually recognizing it as a sovereign 
state.26 The House of Lords considered this conclusion impermis-
sible. Lord Reid opines the certificate precluded any finding that the 
German Democratic Republic is a sovereign state; therefore he 
thinks it must be treated as an organization subordinate to the Soviet 
Union, whose acts are valid as acts of an agent of the Soviet Union.27 
Three other members of the court concur without adding any 
further arguments. The fifth judge, Lord Wilberforce, also con-
23. Carl Z~ Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125, 
137-38 (H.L.). Lord Wilberforce also voiced misgivings about the "legal vacuum" 
which, according to the Court of Appeal, exists in the territory of East Germany. 
See id. at 177. 
24. Id. at 135. 
25. Carl Z~ Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1965] 1 Ch. 596, 637-38 
(C.A. 1964). 
26. Id. at 651. 
27. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner&: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125, 
136 (H.L.). 
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curring, refers to Brierly's The Law of Nations,28 where it is said 
that a recognizing state is not concerned with the question whether 
the state of affairs which it is recognizing is legal by the national 
law of another state. In his Lordship's view, this principle would be 
violated if the English courts were to take account of the fact that 
the Soviet Union considers the government of the German Demo-
cratic Republic as independent.29 Lord Wilberforce also discusses 
the fact that the second certificate fails to state that the Soviet Union 
is de facto exercising governing authority in East Germany. This, he 
says, must not be interpreted as allowing an inference that there is 
some other body with de facto authority independent of the Soviet 
Union, since the certificate expressly negates recognition of any 
other authority, de facto or de jure, by the British Government.30 
III. THE RECOGNIZED REGIME AND Loss OF ACTUAL CONTROL 
With due respect, the logic of neither of the opinions rendered 
by Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce is exactly what one might call 
compelling. For one thing, both judges fail to appreciate fully the 
peculiar legal situation of an occupation regime. Neglecting this 
aspect for the moment, their reasoning seems to be questionable even 
if it were applied to a non-occupied country. It is generally accepted 
that a government recognized by the forum as a de jure government 
over a certain territory can lose actual control over part or all of it by 
a revolution or by intervention from outside. In such a situation, acts 
emanating from the revolutionary forces or the intervenor will 
certainly not be recognized by a foreign government as acts of the 
de jure government unless the de jure government gives them 
effect after regaining control or it reaches an agreement with the 
intervenor.31 
Whether such acts can be recognized at all depends on the atti-
tude a court takes when it is confronted with acts of a non-recognized 
authority. If it looks to its own executive for guidance, as the English 
courts profess to do, it will treat them as nullities as long as its 
government has not given at least de facto recognition to the new 
regime. Conceding this to be the settled practice, both Lord Reid 
and Lord Wilberforce distinguish the present case on the ground 
that the German Democratic Republic was set up with the consent 
of the Soviet Union rather than by revolution.32 One need not go so 
28. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 147 (6th ed. 1963). 
29. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125, 
180 (H.L.). 
30. Ibid. 
31. 1 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (1965); R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1965). 
32. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125, 
135-37, 178-79 (H.L.). 
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far as to call this a distinction without a difference and still be at a 
loss to understand why the distinction was required or even sug-
gested by the Foreign Secretary's certificate, as the House of Lords 
appears to assume. The certificate only states that the British govern-
ment has not recognized, either de jure or de facto, any authority 
in East Germany other than the Soviet Union (and for some pur-
poses, the Control Council).33 This statement is a far cry from saying, 
as the House of Lords did say, that every governmental act carried 
out in that territory must be attributed to the authority of the Soviet 
Union. In the revolution and intervention situations, exactly the 
opposite would follow: only acts which are in fact acts of the de jure 
government would be given effect in an English court. Why should 
an authority, previously recognized as the de jure power over a 
certain territory, be held to be the author of acts performed by a 
successor authority when the succession occurred peacefully but not 
when it occurred by force? The many instances, after World War II, 
in which European countries have terminated their colonial regimes 
in Asia and Africa seem to suggest that peaceful consensual creation 
of an independent regime is frequently motivated by the desire to 
avoid a revolution which would have brought about such indepen-
dence. Thus there is a functional proximity, if not identity, of the 
two occurrences which obviously militates against a different treat-
ment as to their legal consequences in a foreign court. This approach 
supports the position of the Court of Appeal which believed that it 
was entitled to take notice of the termination of actual control over 
a certain territory by a government recognized by the forum as the 
de jure authority in that territory, regardless of whether termination 
is due to a revolution against, or to consent by, the former sovereign. 
Is it true, as Lord Wilberforce alleges, that the view taken by the 
Court of Appeal in cases where authority over some territory is 
terminated by consent violates the principle expressed by Brierly? 
Careful reading of Brierly's exposition reveals that the reference to 
his book is beside the point. He discusses the question whether 
recognition de jure requires that the recognized state of affairs be 
legally created. In this context, he dismisses the proposition that 
legality under the national law of another state is necessary,34 thereby 
taking a generally accepted position which, however, has nothing to 
do with the problem at hand. Lord Wilberforce should not even 
have cited Brierly's statement as authority for the principle that a 
recognizing state can treat as irrelevant the view taken by another 
state as to the legal or factual situation in any territory. Given the 
decentralized nature of the recognition process under current inter-
national law, that principle can hardly be debated. Yet, again, it is a 
!l!I. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
!14 • .BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 147. 
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different matter from the problem with which Brierly is concerned. 
Moreover, the principle that recognition by one state of another is 
res inter alios acta for a third state would hardly argue against the 
position of the Court of Appeal. It is not correct to say that the Court 
of Appeal treated an authority that has been recognized by the Soviet 
Union as recognized by Britain; such an attitude, or one closely 
approximating it, would clearly conflict with the Foreign Secretary's 
certificate. The Court of Appeal merely viewed recognition by the 
Soviet Union of the German Democratic Republic as a fact showing 
loss of actual control over the latter's territory and thus equivalent to 
the breaking away of a territory from a de jure government's control 
by revolution.85 
How does this approach square with the language of the certifi-
cate? Defendants went so far as to allege that the Court of Appeal's 
conclusion was in fact suggested by the deliberate and significant 
abstention in the certificate from any positive assertion to the effect 
that the Soviet Union was de facto exercising governing authority 
or control in the Eastern Zone. Rejecting this argument, Lord 
Wilberforce correctly pointed out that de jure recognition is gener-
ally the fullest recognition which can be given,36 and that therefore 
it is erroneous to attach any weight to the absence of a statement in 
the certificate confirming de facto recognition of Soviet authority in 
East Germany. While it is appropriate to say that a certain regime 
has not been recognized, either de facto or de jure, a statement that a 
regime has been recognized de jure as well as de facto is redundant. 
The defendants were obviously misled by the term "de facto recogni-
tion," which is notorious for its confusing quality. Used accurately, 
it means only recognition of a limited character. The qualifications 
to which it is subject depend upon the circumstances and the inten-
tion of the recognizing state, but most frequently it is limited in 
terms of finality in that it is provisional rather than definitive.37 
35. While the Foreign Secretary's certificate would not seem to preclude this find-
ing, see p. 933 infra, it is at least questionable whether the Soviet Union's declarations 
warrant the far-reaching conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeal. Loss of actual 
control is a question of fact, not a matter of mere declarations. In 1954, the allied 
representatives in West Germany found that the actual situation in East Germany 
had not been altered by the Soviet statement of March 25, 1954, purporting to grant 
sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic. See Joint Declaration by the Allied 
High Commission, on the Status of East Germany, April 8, 1954, DocuMENTS ON 
GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, ·at 154. In support of the Court of Appeal, it might 
be argued that the East German situation in 1964, when the court decided the case, 
was probably different from what it was ten years before. However, there is seemingly 
no evidence on which such a finding could be based. Furthermore, the East German 
statute whose effect is at issue in the Zeiss case was enacted in 1952. See note 19 supra 
and accompanying text. Thus, conceivably, the factual situation in 1952 may be deemed 
controlling. 
36. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966) 3 Weekly L.R. 125 
180 (H.L.). 
37. :BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 147; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 74, 
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Since recognition cannot be at the same time limited and complete, 
it is of no avail to point to the absence of de facto recognition once 
de jure recognition has been given. On the other hand, recognition 
of a state as well as of a government is generally held to require a 
certain effectiveness and stability of the new regime; an act of recog-
nition where these requirements are not met is considered an inter-
national wrong.38 Thus, a court can safely entertain a presumption 
of actual control over a certain territory by a new regime to which 
the forum's government has granted de jure recognition unless this 
act has been superseded by subsequent de jure or de facto recog-
nition of another regime in the same territory or in any part of it. 
However, the situation in the Zeiss case is one in which the 
forum's government certified that it had recognized de jure an au-
thority established some fifteen years ago and had not given recogni-
tion to any other state or government respecting the same territory: 
does the language of this certificate exclude the possibility of finding 
that the de jure authority lost actual control over that territory? 
Plainly not, since even though actual control can be presumed to 
have existed at the time recognition was first granted, it need not 
have continued to the present time. A new regime which is not even 
recognized de facto may in fact have replaced the one still recognized 
by the forum. It is suggested that an English court would not be un-
faithful to precedent if it were to take notice of this state of affairs by 
disregarding the acts of the new, unrecognized regime, rather than 
by entertaining the fiction of attributing such acts to the recognized 
authority.39 If the policy underlying the English precedents is to 
avoid embarrassment for the executive and also not to defeat the 
purposes for which the course of non-recognition is pursued, the 
attitude of the Court of Appeal seems to effectuate this policy much 
better than does that of the House of Lords. In this context, it must 
at 136 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 31, § 96, Re-
porters' Note 2(a) (1965). See also the statement by the British Foreign Secretary in 
the House of Commons on March 21, 1951, outlining the British practice; it is re-
produced in BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 148 n.2 . 
.!18. 1 O'CONNELL, op. cit. supra note .!II, at 143, 148; TEUSCHER, DIE VORZEITIGE 
ANERKENNUNG IM VoELKERRECHT 61 (1959); REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 31, 
§ 99(2) • 
.!19. In effect, this would seem to be a logical extension of the position taken in 
Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori, (1937] I Ch. 513, and in 
Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha, [1938] 2 K.B. 176 (C.A. 1938). In both cases, it was held 
that acts carried out by a recognized de facto government in the territory under its 
control prevail over conflicting acts of the government still recognized de jure with 
respect to the same territory. The Foreign Office certificate received by the court in 
the Banco de Bilbao case seems to have been somewhat ambiguous in that it stated 
only that General Franco's Nationalist regime was recognized as exercising effective 
administrative control in parts of Spain. The court, however, interpreted this to imply 
recognition of Franco's regime as a (de facto) government. For a comment, see I 
O'CoNNELL, op. cit. supra note 31, at 174, 198-99, 203. Thus, the situation borders on 
the one discussed in the text. 
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be kept in mind that withdrawal of de jure recognition unaccom-
panied by recognition of a new regime has a very doubtful standing 
in international law.40 The prevailing opinion appears to deny this 
type of revocability, although "pure" revocation has occasionally 
occurred in actual state practice.41 In a situation where a government 
is not prepared to recognize a new regime that has in fact replaced 
the previously recognized authority in part or all of its territory, the 
government can hardly certify to a court the actual state of affairs in 
that territory because to do so might imperil its non-recognition 
attitude. At any rate, in the Zeiss case, the Foreign Office was not 
requested to express its views about the real situation in East Ger-
many; it was merely consulted about its own acts of recognition. 
Under these circumstances, the alleged conflict between the Court 
of Appeal's attitude and the language of the certificate, far from 
being obvious, is more likely to be a chimera. 
IV. GERMANY UNDER ALLIED OCCUPATION 
Turning now to the special problems of the occupation regime 
in Germany, it must be noted at the outset that the analysis advanced 
by the House of Lords has a striking resemblance to a theory de-
veloped by the late John Foster Dulles in his capacity as Secretary of 
State at an historic news conference some eight years ago. At that 
time, the Soviet Union had launched the second major Berlin crisis 
and was in fact denouncing certain obligations and the correspond-
ing rights of the Western allies which are stated in agreements be-
tween the four powers, entered into at the conclusion of World 
War II.42 In response to questions relating to the possible reaction 
of the United States in case the Soviets should turn over to the 
German Democratic Republic the control of traffic to and from 
Berlin, Mr. Dulles indicated that the East German authorities might 
be dealt with as agents of the Soviet Union but that they would not 
be accepted as a substitute for the Soviet Union in discharging the 
latter's obligations.43 Despite their kinship there is of course an im-
portant difference between Mr. Dulles' theory of agency and the 
position of the House of Lords which views the German Democratic 
Republic as an organization subordinate to the Soviet Union. While 
Mr. Dulles was concerned with the vindication of Western rights of 
access to and egress from Berlin and thus with very specific and 
narrowly defined issues, the House of Lords deals with the general 
40. 1 O'CONNELL, op. cit. supra note 31, at 173-77; 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra 
note 37, § 75g, at 150•52; REsTATEMENT (SECOND), op. cit. supra note 31, § 96. 
41. 1 O'CONNELL, op. dt. supra note 31, at 173 n.10. 
42. See Note From the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Ambassador at 
Moscow, Nov. 27, 1958, in DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 348. 
43. See DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 343-45. 
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legal status of East Germany. Assuming without inquiry that the 
Western allies have certain rights with respect to Berlin and that the 
Soviet Union owes corresponding obligations, it is obvious that in 
the absence of consent by the West, those rights cannot be termi-
nated nor the obligations transferred to the German Democratic 
Republic.44 Hence the doctrine of agency: the actual replacement of 
Soviet Union officials exercising control over traffic to and from 
Berlin by East German officials would not be allowed to operate as 
a substitution of a new obligor; rather, the Soviet Union would con-
tinue to be held responsible, with the German Democratic Republic 
functionaries acting as its agents. This makes reasonably good sense 
once the premise is accepted that, under international law as well as 
under domestic law, an obligor cannot escape his duties by virtue of 
transactions with a third party to which the obligee has not agreed. 
The House of Lords, however, appears to have gone much further 
than that. Having determined that because the British government 
has not recognized the German Democratic Republic, he is pre-
cluded from viewing it as a sovereign state, Lord Reid concluded 
that the East German regime must necessarily be exercising power 
derived from, and therefore attributable to, the Soviet Union.45 It is 
submitted that this conclusion is not well-founded in that it takes 
the dichotomy of wholly independent power ("sovereign state") and 
wholly derivative power ("subordinate organization") to be all-in-
clusive. This somewhat crude approach probably does not fit any 
occupation regime and is certainly inapplicable to the one estab-
lished in Germany after World War II. 
Under the general law of warfare, an occupant has power to 
legislate and to take certain other actions in the territory under its 
control, which means, of course, that the occupied country lacks 
complete self-determination and is thus not absolutely independent. 
On the other hand, the occupant's power is generally held to be 
limited.46 Consequently, all acts emanating from the domestic au-
thorities of the occupied country and relating to matters beyond 
the reach of the occupant, are home-grown acts so to speak, since 
by hypothesis they cannot be attributed to the occupant's power. 
The German situation is complicated primarily by two factors. 
First, although Germany's occupation was the result of wartime 
military actions, it has considerably outlasted the cessation of active 
44. To the same effect is the Statement by the Department of State on Legal As-
pects of the Berlin Situation, Dec. 20, 1958, DocuMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra 
note 2, at 367, 373. 
45. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
46, See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, T .S. No. 403. For a discussion and reference to further 
material, see McDOUGAL &: FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBUC ORDER 744-71 
(1961). 
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hostilities and is therefore more than an ordinary occupatio bellica. 
Second, from the inception of their occupation regime, the allied 
forces have claimed to possess, and have in fact exercised, larger 
powers in Germany than would have been granted them under the 
general rules of warfare.47 In a declaration issued June 5, 1945, less 
than a month after the unconditional surrender of the German 
forces, the Allies stated that no central government existed in Ger-
many and that the governments of the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Britain, and France therefore assumed supreme authority 
with respect to Germany, including the powers possessed by the 
German government and any state, municipal, or local government 
or authority.48 The assumption of said authority and powers, how-
ever, was not to be construed to effect the annexation of Germany.49 
The same day, the Allied Statement on Control Machinery in Ger-
many promulgated the rule that during the period in which Ger-
many was carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional sur-
render, supreme authority in Germany would be exercised by the 
Commanders-in-Chief, each in his zone of occupation, and jointly 
through the Control Council in matters affecting Germany as a 
whole.50 In actual practice, the military governments in the four 
zones of occupation were never complete in the sense of a machinery 
which could wholly replace the domestic German authorities. Rather, 
German municipal and local governments more or less continued 
to function and were merely placed under allied supervision which 
sought to ensure that active Nazi personnel were removed and that 
the occupation laws and the orders of occupation authorities were 
given effect. Gradually, even at the higher levels of state and re-
gional government, German authorities were set up again, and at 
all levels the scope of activities within which German authorities 
were allowed to function was constantly, albeit slowly, extended.51 
The practice thus pursued in all four zones was consistent with the 
"Political Principles" accepted by the heads of government of the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain at their Berlin (Pots-
dam) Conference in 1945 and set forth in the protocol of the meet-
ing. 52 Only that part of the "Principles" which provided for the 
establishment of certain essential central German administrative 
47. See McDOUGAL &: FELICIANO, supra note 46, at 768-70; 2 OPPENHEIM, INTER· 
NATIONAL LAW § 265a (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952). 
48. See DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 12. 
49. Preamble, para. 5, last sentence of the Declaration of June 5, 1945, DOCUMENTS 
ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 13. 
50. DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 19. 
51. For details, see FRIEDMANN, THE ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY 
58-61, 70-88, 100-09 (1947). 
52. Protocol of the Proceedings of the :Berlin Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, Part II A9, 
DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, at 29 (United States Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations ed. 1961). 
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departments was not carried out.53 In direct proportion to the grow-
ing tension between East and West, both sides created separate 
central organizations, each of which began to act as a German state, 
eventually to be recognized as being "sovereign" in its territory 
by different parts of the international community.54 However, while 
the Federal Republic of Germany received recognition by the Soviet 
Union as well as by the Western nations, the German Democratic 
Republic is not recognized by any but the Communist countries. 
V. INADEQUACY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS RATIONALE 
The foregoing brief outline of the German post-war develop-
ment in conjunction with the above considerations regarding an 
occupation regime in general should suffice to make it clear that 
the House of Lords in the Zeiss case was rather rash in concluding 
that Britain's recognition of the Soviet Union as de jure authority 
in East Germany required the British courts to treat acts of the 
German Democratic Republic as acts of an agent of the Soviet 
Union and therefore valid. First, the court should have examined 
more closely the precise meaning of Britain's "recognition" of the 
Soviet Union's de jure authority with respect to East Germany. As 
mentioned above, the four powers which formed the occupation 
regime in Germany expressly disclaimed an annexation. 55 Conse-
quently, the Soviet zone of Germany was never recognized as a part 
of the Soviet Union's own territory. Furthermore, one would sur-
mise that recognition of the Soviet authority in East Germany did 
not mean recognition of a new state since the manner in which the 
control machinery in Germany was set up (with the Control Council 
in charge of all "matters affecting Germany as a whole") expresses 
an intention to preserve Germany as a political unit, just as the 
Potsdam Protocol clearly states an intention to treat it as an eco-
nomic unit.56 The only remaining, and indeed the most likely, possi-
bility is that the Soviet Union was merely recognized as the occupy-
ing power in its zone of occupation. 
Assuming this is the correct interpretation of the Soviet Union's 
de jure authority in East Germany, the House of Lords should then 
have inquired into the status of the German authorities in that zone 
before and after the creation of the German Democratic Republic. 
Although a full discussion of this problem would be beyond the 
proper scope of this Comment, it is not unrealistic to suppose that 
the situation in East Germany before the establishment of a central 
53. Id., Part II A9(iv), at 29. 
54. See note II supra. 
55. See note 49 supra. 
56. Protocol of the Proceedings of the :Berlin Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, Part II 1314, 
DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, op. cit. supra note 52, at 33. 
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state was probably not radically different from that prevailing in 
the Western zones. The Soviet authorities have interfered more 
drastically and more frequently with Germany's political life but, 
on the administrative side, they too seem to have allowed the con-
tinued and gradually expanded functioning of domestic German 
authorities.57 With respect to the Western zones, it is the generally 
accepted view of German courts and writers that acts of German 
authorities even before the creation of a central state are not to be 
treated as acts of the occupation authorities unless they were done 
pursuant to a direct, specific order of the latter.58 Do we have to 
deal differently with acts of East German authorities because in 
the course of time they became increasingly Communist-dominated 
and thus brought into line with the Soviet occupation power? It 
is not easy to assess the legal significance that is to be attached to 
the indubitable political conformity which the Soviets imposed on 
the German territory under their control. In West Germany, acts 
of the East German authorities before as well as after the creation 
of the German Democratic Republic have always been considered 
as acts of German rather than Russian bodies. 59 Neither the fact 
that basic political freedoms have been denied the people in East 
Germany nor the fact that the German Democratic Republic is not 
recognized by the West German government has precluded this 
conclusion. To be sure, it would not have been altogether unrea-
sonable to argue that the German Communists representing the 
East German regime are in such a state of political subordination 
that even in legal terms they must be viewed as simply the long 
arm of the Soviet Union. It might be difficult though, once this 
argument is accepted, to avoid the consequence of treating on an 
equal basis all those East European countries which had been allied 
with Germany during World War II. This, however, has never 
been done in the post-war period, during which time such nations 
were clearly relegated to the status of more or less dependent satel-
lites of the Soviet Union. It must be remembered that, at least prior 
to the Paris peace treaties of 1947,60 these countries were Soviet-oc-
cupied territory and that consequently the Communist regimes in 
such countries as Rumania or Hungary emerged from essentially 
the same conditions of Soviet occupation as did the East German 
regime. Nonetheless, in the international community, these coun-
tries have never been treated as agents of the Soviet Union. The 
57. See FRIEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 51, at 60-61, 76-80, 101, 104-06. 
58. See Muench, Entscheidungen nationaler Gerichte in voelkerrechtlichen Fragen: 
Deutsche Rechtsprechung 1951-1957, 21 ZEITSCHRIET FUER AUSLAENDISCHES OEFFENT-
LICHES RECHT UND VoELKERRECHT 510, 535-41 (1961); 22 id. 729, 766-69, 774-79 (1962). 
59. See 21 id. at 510, 567-75. 
60. Peace Treaty with Rumania, Feb. 10, 1947, 61(2) Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1649; 
Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, 61(2) Stat. 1915, T.I.A.S. No. 1650; Peace 
Treaty with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, 61(2) Stat. 2065, T.I.A.S. No. 1651. 
March 1967] Comment 939 
case for distinguishing East Germany from them is not an easy one, 
although conceivably a distinction could be based on the argument 
that, unlike the East European countries, East Germany comprises 
only part of a nation which was separated from the rest of that 
nation against its will and in violation of international agreement 
as expressed in the Potsdam Protocol.61 
At any rate, it is at least regrettable that the House of Lords did 
not find it necessary to discuss the exact meaning of "recognition" 
of the Soviet Union as a de jure authority in East Germany in view 
of the specific circumstances of Germany's status under allied occu-
pation. Its failure to do so accounts for another serious shortcoming 
of the opinions. Nowhere do the judges discuss the consequences 
(other than proper authority of plaintiff's solicitors) which may 
flow from their view of the East German situation. Since they do 
not even hint at possible differences between the "recognition" at 
hand and the more common recognition of a new state or a change 
in government or territory, one is left wondering whether all of 
the activity in East Germany will now be treated in English courts 
exactly as if it had happened in the Soviet Union's own territory. 
More particularly, does the act-of-state doctrine apply to acts of 
expropriation effected by the East German regime on the theory 
that these acts must be considered as having been done by an agent 
of the Soviet Union, the recognized de jure authority? As formulated 
by American courts, the act-of-state doctrine is inapplicable to acts 
of unrecognized states as well as to extra-territorial acts.62 There-
fore, if the German Democratic Republic were viewed realistically, 
that is, as a German state which is not recognized by the West, it 
probably could not benefit from the doctrine. However, if the 
theory of the House of Lords is followed, it seems hard indeed to 
avoid its application.63 This consequence is of particular significance 
in the Zeiss case itself now that it has been sent back to the trial 
court for litigation on the merits. 
61. See VON MUENCH, DAS VOELKERRECHTLICHE DELIKT IN DER MODERNEN ENTWICKLUNG 
DER VOELKERRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFI' 89-90, 98-102 (1963). 
62. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). Subsequent 
to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sabbatino, the operation of the act-of-state 
doctrine in this country has of course been further limited by the Hickenlooper 
Amendment. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 30l(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2161 (1964). 
63. Conceivably, one could argue that acts of the authorities in East Germany, 
even though the House of Lords attributes them to the Soviet Union for purposes 
of recognition, are, for purposes of the act-of-state doctrine, still to be distingnished 
from acts performed by the Soviet Union on its own territory, simply because the 
Soviet Union is not the actual sovereign in East Germany but merely an occupation 
power. The fact that neither the Western allies nor the Soviet Union have allowed 
the Hague Regulations to govern their occupation regime in Germany, see note 47 
supra, cannot mean that they claimed to be the German sovereign. Were it otherwise, 
the disclaimer of annexation, see note 49 supra, would make no sense. 
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VI. THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE Zeiss CONTROVERSY 
Undeniably, the Zeiss controversy poses a serious dilemma to the 
courts in a common-law country. For a long time they have been 
committed to the doctrine that no effect can be given to acts of a 
government which the forum refuses to recognize. Supposedly, this 
doctrine is designed to avoid embarrassment of the forum's execu-
tive branch of government which bears the primary responsibility 
for the conduct of a nation's foreign affairs. One may wonder, how-
ever, why the courts in civil-law countries have never felt the need 
for such a sweeping doctrine; when they refuse to enforce acts of 
an unrecognized government, this is usually done on the basis of 
public policy considerations as applied to the circumstances of the 
particular case. The Swiss Zeiss decision illustrates this approach 
rather well.134 The Swiss Bundesgericht points out that non-recogni-
tion of the German Democratic Republic does not prevent it from 
applying East German law. In the first place, the court argues, giv-
ing effect to that law could never be taken as recognition in the 
international law sense because a judge has no power to grant such 
recognition. Second, conflict of laws rules must be understood to 
refer to the law which is actually enforced in the foreign territory 
to which they point.65 Then, turning to a consideration of the merits 
of the case, the court engages in a process of frankly weighing the 
equities between the two rival organizations. Although the decision 
in favor of the East German party has been criticized, such criticism 
is not based on the fact that the German Democratic Republic is 
not recognized by Switzerland, but rather because it was felt that 
the court had not taken into account all of the relevant considera-
tions in assessing the competing claims of the parties.66 
Is the attitude exemplified by the Swiss Zeiss case liable to pro-
duce better results than the traditional position of the English courts 
with respect to unrecognized governments? To a large extent, the 
answer seems to depend on how realistic the recognition policy of 
the forum's executive is. If the forum government is willing to 
recognize a new regime once it has gained effective control over 
most of a state's territory and this control is likely to continue,67 
little harm will follow from the English doctrine. On the contrary, 
64. See VEB Carl Zeiss Jena v. Firm.a Carl Zeiss Heidenheim, .Bundesgericht, 
March 30, 1965, 91 II Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen .Bundesgerichtes 117 
(Switz.). 
65. Id. at 126-27. 
66. See Schaumann, Entschaedigungslose Konfiskationen vor dem Schweizerischen 
Bundesgericht: Eine Aenderung der Rechtsprechung, 62 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-
ZEITUNG 33 (1966). 
67. These factors were officially stated to be the test which determines the British 
recognition practice. See Statement by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons, 
March 21, 1951, supra note 37. But it has been flatly stated that "reality does not bear 
out the theory of British practice." Greig, supra note 22, at 128. 
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it may have the advantage of concentrating the difficult and delicate 
fact-finding process concerning the political situation in a foreign 
country by entrusting it to the Foreign Office which supposedly 
has relatively easy access to all the relevant information and possesses 
the expertise necessary for an informed judgment. However, it is no 
secret that in current state practice recognition of a new regime 
is often delayed for many years even though the regime may be 
firmly established. 68 Where such a discrepancy exists between the 
facts which allegedly determine recognition and the actual recog-
nition practice, a court may find it embarrassing to follow strictly 
the English doctrine. Thus, American courts have seen fit to deviate 
from that doctrine, but the cases are not entirely consistent.69 Civil 
law courts, on the other hand, untrammeled by any broad rule re-
lating to unrecognized regimes, will encounter no serious difficulty 
in dealing with this situation. They can enforce acts of the un-
recognized regime when they feel that by doing so substantial justice 
will be done, regardless of the political nature of the foreign regime; 
and, on the other hand, they can refuse enforcement of an act which 
is politically tainted or, for any other reason, contrary to a strong 
public policy of the forum. 
Reading the Zeiss opinions of the House of Lords and of the 
Court of Appeal, one cannot help feeling that neither court faced 
up to reality. Paraphrasing in part the words of Lord Wilberforce,70 
it might be said that the Court of Appeal treats East Germany as 
a legal vacuum whereas the House of Lords fills this vacuum with 
a fiction. Undoubtedly, legal fictions can serve useful purposes, but 
they should be used sparingly, if only because they have a tendency 
to mislead the unwary and the less sophisticated. Before a judge 
resorts to this device, he should ask himself whether the situation 
can be dealt with in more realistic terms. More specifically, the 
House of Lords should have analyzed the East German situation 
with a view to the interests underlying the Western policy of non-
recognition of the German Democratic Republic. It could have 
easily discovered that this policy is primarily designed to achieve 
two interrelated objectives. First, it supports the West German gov-
ernment's claim to be the only freely constituted representative of 
the German people. 71 Second, it buttresses the position that the 
Soviet Union has continuing responsibilities with respect to Ger-
68. BRIERLY, supra note 28, at 140; 1 O'CoNNELL, supra note 31, at 175. 
69. See note 22 supra. 
70. See note 23 supra. 
71. The Foreign Secretary's second certificate, see note 25 supra, incorporated an 
earlier communique by the three Western Foreign Ministers to the effect that "the 
three governments consider the government of the Federal German Republic as the 
only German government freely and legitimately constituted and, therefore, entitled 
to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international 
affairs." 
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many as a result of the joint military occupation and the various 
agreements with the Western allies.72 The court then should have 
considered the adverse effects which each of the alternative holdings 
might have on the pursuit of these objectives. In view of the fact that 
West German courts enforce East German legislative, judicial, and 
administrative acts as long as their substance is not repugnant to 
the forum's public policy, it is hard to see why similar treatment 
by an English court would undermine the Western position that 
only the West German Government is entitled to speak for Ger-
many. The same is true mutatis mutandis with respect to the second 
objective of the Western non-recognition policy: giving effect to 
East German acts that are unrelated to Soviet responsibilities in 
Germany is quite consistent with the view that such responsibilities 
still exist. If this is correct, the result reached by the House of Lords 
can be justified without taking refuge behind the highly artificial 
fiction on which the court relies. 
The crucial question of course is whether this result is more 
in keeping with our notions of justice and fairness than the decision 
of the Court of Appeal. It must be kept in mind that we are merely 
dealing with the preliminary issue of whether the plaintiff has duly 
authorized its solicitors. Since the Court of Appeal disregards East 
German legislation in its totality, the plaintiff, functioning under 
such legislation as it does,73 could not be heard in an English court 
if the Court of Appeal had been affirmed. Clearly, the House of 
Lords regarded this as an undesirable outcome. The court's effort 
to give plaintiff a chance to be heard on the merits seems quite 
understandable and may win it applause. However, in West Ger-
many, the decision has already been termed "a bitter pill for 
Bonn,''74 and this it might turn out to be if, but only if, the reason-
ing of the House of Lords should have the consequence of making 
the act-of-state doctrine applicable in all its rigor.75 Considerations 
which make it appropriate to allow the plaintiff a hearing on the 
merits, call for an equal treatment of the defendants which would 
hardly be satisfied if the act-of-state doctrine is applied as a conse-
quence of the House of Lords' holding in the Zeiss case.76 It is sub-
72. For a discussion of the theory of agency developed by Secretary of State Dulles, 
see notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text. 
73. See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text. 
74. See Bull, "Bittere Pille fuer Bonn," in Die Zeit, July 19, 1966, p. 15. A similar 
disposition was inflected in East Germany by Feige & Reichrath, Das Zeiss-Urteil des 
House of Lords-eine eindeutige Ablehnung der westdeutschen Ausschliesslichkeits-
anmassung, 20 NEUE JuSTIZ 549 (1966). But while it may be a bitter pill for Bonn to 
learn that East German legislation is enforced in an English court, it might not be 
pure candy for the East German communists to be told that this is done merely be-
cause their state is a subordinate agency of the Soviet Union. Significantly, the article 
by Feige & Reichrath, supra, does not mention this reasoning at all. 
75. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. 
76. The effect of applying the act-of-state doctrine would be to prevent the court 
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mitted that the most desirable result would be that both parties 
have an unrestricted opportunity to present their case on the merits, 
and surely that could not be a disaster for anyone. 
Herbert L. Bernstein 
from examining without restrictions those acts of expropriation, which in view of 
the Zeiss litigation in other countries, see notes 8 & 9 supra, appear to be crucial to 
the defendants' case. 
